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UNLEASHING THE WILDCATS: THE SUPREME COURT
IMMUNIZES WILDCAT STRIKES FROM INDIVIDUAL
DAMAGE LIABILITY FOR EMPLOYER LOSSES
RESULTING FROM THE WILDCAT STRIKE,
IN COMPLETE AUTO TRANSIT, INC. V REIS
INTRODUCTION
Some seventy years ago, in the celebrated Danbury Hatters cases,' the
Supreme Court of the United States held individual union members person-
ally liable for a damage judgment rendered against their parent union. In
the ensuing efforts to satisfy that judgment, many unionists lost their homes
through garnishment actions. To prevent a recurrence of this spectacle,
Congress enacted legislation immunizing individual union members from
fiscal responsibility for damage judgments against their unions. Under sec-
tion 301(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act,2 damage judgments
can be satisfied only from the union as an entity, not from individual union
members.
The Court, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 3 now has extended indi-
vidual immunity from damage suits arising from union-authorized activities
to cover unauthorized individual work stoppages, or wildcat strikes, as well.
The Court relied largely upon congressional intent, which was construed as
preventing garnishment and attachment proceedings against individual
union members' homes to satisfy judgments against a union. The result,
however, leaves the employer without means to recoup his losses incurred
from a wildcat strike.
The Court's ruling completes a 180-degree change in position in the last
seventy-five years. Individual union members, once held solely liable for
damages arising from union-directed strikes, are now immune from damages
arising from both union-authorized and wildcat strikes.
The pendulum has completed its arc since the Danbur Hatters cases;
whether it will swing back depends on whether Congress recognizes that the
inequitable financial burdens shouldered by the employer as a result of Com-
plete Auto Transit are, ironically, those once shouldered by individual employ-
1. Loewe v. Savings Bank of Danbury, 236 F. 444 (2d Cir. 1916), aj'd, 242 U.S. 357
(1917); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915); Lawlor v. Loewe, 209 F. 721 (2d Cir. 1913);
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). Here, Danbury, Connecticut, hatmakers sued 175 mem-
bers of the United Hatters of North America for damages resulting from a nationwide recogni-
tional boycott on grounds of antitrust violations. In Loewe ,. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), the
Supreme Court sustained the hatmakers' right to sue union members under the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), including the availability of treble damages under that act. The
Court later affirmed a $252,130 judgment in Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915), and in
Loewe v. Savings Bank of Danbury, 236 F. 444 (2d Cir. 1916), af'd 242 U.S. 357 (1917), a writ
of attachment for $240,000 was issued. The strike began on July 25, 1902, idling the plant for
some seven months. Lawlor v. Loewe, 209 F. 721 (2d Cir. 1913).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976).
3. 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981).
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ees. This recognition should provoke Congress to provide a legislative
remedy to deter unauthorized work stoppages and to give the employer some
financial relief; in doing so, Congress could snap the leash on striking wild-
catters whose activities threaten to subvert the collective-bargaining process.
I. EVOLUTION OF DAMAGE SUITS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL UNION
MEMBERS
At common law, damage suits could not be brought against labor un-
ions or other unincorporated associations in their common names,4 but had
to be brought against union members as individuals. 5 The Supreme Court
abolished this rule in United Mine Workers . Coronado Coal Co. 6 by holding that
unions were suable entities distinct from their individual members. 7 Both
individual unionists and their unions were liable for money damage judg-
ments for breach of their collective bargaining agreement until 1947, when
Congress enacted section 301 (b) of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947,8 principally to avoid another Danbuy Hatters.9 Section 301 (b) provides
that money judgments obtained against a union can be enforced only
against union assets, not against individual members.' 0 The statute was si-
lent about whether individual union members could be sued in lieu of the
union. A quarter of a century later, the Supreme Court in Atkinson v. Sinclair
Refining Co." held that individual union members could not be held liable
when their union violated a no-strike clause in its collective bargaining
agreement. The Atkinson Court did not reach the question of whether union
members would be liable individually for wildcat strikes in breach of a no-
strike clause. ' 2 That question was answered in the negative in Sinclair Oil
4. See Cox, Some Aspects ofthe Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 274,
304 (1947). See also 4 J. JENKINS, TREATISE IN LABOR LAW, § 23.2 (1971).
5. See, e.g., Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). Damage suits against individual work-
ers date from feudal times, when the infamous Statute of Laborers, 2 Stat. 31, 25 Edw. III
(1350) was enacted after the emergency Ordinance of Laborers, 2 Stat. 26, 23 Edw. III (1349),
to prevent the villein's flight from the manor into the towns for higher wages. Workers at that
time were at a premium because the Black Plague had decimated the population of Europe. To
stop escalating wages, the Statute of Laborers was enacted, fixing wages for various classes of
workers and providing for imprisonment of violators. Other laws, the Elizabethan Statute of
Artificers, 5 Eliz. ch. 4 (1562), and the Poor Laws, 39 & 40 Eliz. ch. 3; 43 Eliz. ch. 2 (1601),
further inserted government into labor relations by fixing ordinary wages, with punishments
ranging from whippings to imprisonment. See M. FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW,
§§ 17-19, 23, 24 (1953). See also 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND 184 (A. Renton
ed. 1898).
6. 259 U.S. 344 (1922). The common law rule that suits had to be brought against indi-
vidual union members kept damage suits to a minimum because judgments could not be col-
lected from union coffers. Consequently, such judgments were uncollectable because the
individual workers could not pay them. See J. JENKINS, supra note 4, at § 23.2.
7. This rule has been codified as FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
8. Ch. 120, § 301(b), 61 Stat. 156 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976)).
9. See note I supra. See also Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 248 (1962);
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); 93 CONG. REc. 6283 (1947) (remarks
of Sen. Case); 93 CONG. REc. 5014 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Ball); 92 CONG. REc. 5705 (1946)
(remarks of Sen. Taft).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976).
11. 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
12. d. at 249 n.7.
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Corp. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, 13 where the court
expressly immunized individual union members from fiscal responsibility for
breaches of a no-strike provision even where the union was absolved of liabil-
ity for such a strike. 14 The court noted that although section 301 language
"does not expressly prohibit employer damage suits against employee union
members who engage in a wildcat strike,"' 5 neither does the language au-
thorize such suits. Basing its decision primarily on the legislative history of
section 301, the court insulated individual union members from damage lia-
bility for their own wildcat activities.
The Sinclair Oil holding, however, was not binding on other circuits.16
During the decade between Sinclair Oil and Complete Auto Transit, federal dis-
trict courts divided on whether to assess individual union member liability
for wildcat strike activities. 17 Of the cases insulating individual union mem-
bers from personal liability for wildcat activities, all cited the Sinclair Oil
holding as controlling in their decisions. ' Sinclair Oil was either disregarded
as not controlling 19 or distinguished factually 20 in those decisions imposing
individual liability for breaches of the no-strike provisions. Of the other
cases imposing indiviual liability, Alloy Cast Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers
2'
found liability by interpreting Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight22 and Smith v.
13. 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971).
14. The Sinclair court held, after analyzing the legislative history of section 301, that the
employer's primary remedy is either discharge or discipline. Id. at 54.
15. Id. at 52. See recent decisions, 6 GA. L. REv. 797 (1972), for an analysis of Sinclair Oil.
16. Besides the Seventh Circuit, only the Sixth Circuit has faced the issue of whether to
impose individual liability on wildcat strikers who breach a no-strike clause. See Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 614 F.2d 1110 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981).
17. 'Decisions finding no individual liability include Lakeshore Motor Freight v. Steel
Ha'ulers Local 800, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 483 F. Supp. 1150 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers, 470 F. Supp. 1298
(W.D. Pa. 1979); Benada Aluminum Prod. Co. v. United Steel Workers, 83 Lab. Cas. 1 10,609
(N.D. Ohio 1978); and United States Steel Corp. v. UMW Local 8003, 83 Lab. Cas. 10,612
(D.C. Utah 1978). Cases imposing individual liability include: Certain-Teed Corp. v. United
Steelworkers Local 37A, 484 F. Supp. 726 (M.D. Pa. 1980); New York State United Teachers v.
Thompson, 459 F. Supp. 677 (N.D.N.Y. 1978); Alloy Cast Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 429
F. Supp. 445 (N.D. Ohio 1977); DuQuoin Packing Co. v. Local P-156, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 321 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Ill. 1971).
18. Lakeshore Motor Freight v. Steel Haulers Local 800, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 483 F.
Supp. 1150, 1154 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. International Union of Electri-
cal, Radio & Mach. Workers, 470 F. Supp. 1298, 1299 (W.D. Pa. 1979); United States Steel
Corp. v. UMW Local 8003, 83 Lab. Cas. 10,612, 10,613 (D.C. Utah 1978).
19. See New York State United Teachers v. Thompson, 459 F. Supp. 677, 683 (N.D.N.Y.
1978), where Sinclair Oil was rejected because the usual employer remedies of discharge or disci-
pline did not exist; Certain-Teed Corp. v. United Steelworkers, Local 37A, 484 F. Supp. 726
(M.D. Pa. 1980), which cited the Thompson analysis as controlling over Sinclair Oil.
20. See DuQuoin Packing Co. v. Local P-156, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher
Workmen, 321 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. 11. 1971), where the court found individual liability based
on Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). The 1DuQuoin court distinguished Sinclair
Oil, noting that in Sinclair Oil, the individual union members were charged with acting as
agents and on behalf of their union, not individually as wildcatters.
21. 429 F. Supp. 445 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
22. 424 U.S. 554, 562 (1976). In Hines, the Court held that individual employees could,
under § 301, bring an action against their employer independent of the union. Section 301, the
Court observed, encompasses those suits seeking to vindicate "uniquely personal rights of em-
ployees." Id. at 562. iHines involved a suit by individuals employees against their employer for
unlawful discharge for alleged dishonesty and against their union for failing in its duty of fair
1982]
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Evening News Associaton23 as authorizing damage suits against individuals for
breach of a no-strike clause.
24
The final case rejecting Sinclair Oil, DuQuoin Packing Co. v. Local P-156,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen 25 did so by examining the legis-
lative history of section 301, as did the Sinclair Oil court, but arrived at an
opposite conclusion by distinguishing both the Danbury Hatters cases and At-
kinson. The court noted that in both Atkinson and the Danbury Hatters cases,
the individual union members were charged with acting as agents of their
parent union in furtherance of a union objective.26 The DuQuon court, find-
ing this agency relationship missing, imposed individual liability; if the
union had authorized individual wildcat activity, no liability would have
been imposed. Because the individuals did not act pursuant to a union plan,
but solely as individuals,2 7 liability was found.
During the decade from Sinclair Oil to Complete Auto Transit, the
Supreme Court embraced the agency theory of liability pronounced by Du-
Quoin, but applied the theory to a different wildcat question: Should the
parent international union be liable for wildcat strikes by a.local affiliate? In
Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 28 the Court held that international
unions are liable for damages caused by wildcat strikes of local union affili-
ates only where the parent union authorizes or participates in the strike.
Thus, with the district courts divided on whether to impose individual union
member liability for wildcat strikes, and the Supreme Court finding parent
union liability only where the parent union authorized or sanctioned the
local wildcat strike, the stage was set for Complete Auto Transit.
II. FACTS OF COMPLETE AUTO TRANSIT IN. V REIS
On June 8, 1976, drivers and other employees of Complete Auto
Transit, Inc., a Flint, Michigan transporter of newly manufactured vehicles,
engaged in an unauthorized work stoppage (wildcat strike) because of dissat-
isfaction with how their bargaining agent union, Teamsters Local 332, was
representing them in current collective bargaining negotiations.29 The wild-
cat strike violated a no-strike provision in the existing labor contract between
the union and Complete Auto Transit, Inc., signatories along with other
representation to investigate the dishonesty charges and to exonerate the employees. The em-
ployees, after hiring an attorney, later were absolved of the dishonesty charges.
23. 371 U.S. 195 (1962). In Smith, the Court held that individuals are not barred by § 301
from suing their employers to vindicate their individual rights under the labor contract. In the
case at bar, the employers argued unsuccessfully that a damage remedy would eliminate a
double standard under which employees may sue individually and recover damages individu-
ally, but may not be held liable under the contract individually. See Petitioner's Brief for Certi-
orari at 8, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981). The lower court
distinguished Smith, finding merely a dispute over jurisdiction, not over whether § 301 created a
separate cause of action. 614 F.2d at 1116.
24. 429 F. Supp. at 451.
25. 321 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. I11. 1971).
26. Id. at 1232-33.
27. Id. at 1233. The same reasoning was advanced, albeit futilely, by the employers in
Complete Auto Transit See Petitioner's Brief at 9.
28. 444 U.S. 212, 216 (1979).
29. Id. at 1838. See also Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 5.
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trucking companies to a collective bargaining agreement with the Teamsters
Union. 30 After employees of two similar vehicle haulers also engaged in the
wildcat strike, the employers filed suit under section 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947,31 seeking an injunction and damages
against the wildcatters individually for all losses arising from the strike.
3 2
The employers sought no damages from the union itself, alleging that the
strike was neither union authorized nor union sanctioned. 33 The district
court refused to issue the injunction on the ground that the wildcat strike
was caused by a non-arbitrable issue-the intra-union dispute over ade-
quacy of union negotiation representation. 34 After the employers renewed
their plea for the injunction, the court held further hearings and issued a
preliminary injunction stopping the strike after finding that the intra-union
dispute had been settled; the only remaining issue was whether the employ-
ers would grant amnesty to the wildcatters, an arbitrable issue.35 Nine
months later the employees moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction
and to dismiss the complaint for damages. 36 The district court, relying on
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 37 dissolved the injunction on the
ground that the strike was not caused by an arbitrable issue. The court
thereby reapplied its original logic, and dismissed the damage suit on the
ground that employers may not sue employees for money damages for
breach of a labor contract. 38 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dis-
missal of the damage suit, but ruled that an injunction may be granted even
where the issue precipitating the strike was itself non-arbitrable but led to an
arbitrable issue of whether the wildcatters would receive amnesty.39 The
court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the damage claim
by relying principally on the legislative history of section 301. The court
concluded Congress did not intend to create a money damage remedy
against individual union members for breach of a no-strike provision,40 be-
cause Congress wanted to prevent a recurrence of the Danbury Hatters situa-
tion.4 1 The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit, relying almost
exclusively on the legislative history of section 301 and its predecessor, sec-
30. 101 S. Ct. at 1838. See also Respondent's Brief at 4.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). Section 301(a) authorizes employers and labor unions to
bring suits for breach of the labor contract in federal court.
32. 101 S. Ct. at 1838.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1838-39. The judge denied the back-to-work order based on Boys Markets, Inc.
v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), which permits a narrow exception to the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), prohibition on federal courts
enjoining strikes. A Boys Markets injunction will issue when the labor contract contains a
mandatory grievance or arbitration procedure and when the underlying issue causing the strike
is arbitrable. Id. at 1838 n.2.
35. 101 S. Ct. at 1838.
36. 614 F.2d at 1112.
37. 428 U.S. 397 (1976). The Court prohibited the lower court from enjoining a sympathy
strike because the strike was not over any union-employer dispute subject to arbitration
provisions.
38. 101 S. Ct. at 1839.
39. 614 F.2d at 1114.
40. Id. at 1115.
41. See note I supra.
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tion 10 of the Case Bill,42 which was vetoed in 1946 by President Truman.
43
The Court concluded that Congress intended to immunize individual union
employees from damage liability both for union-authorized and non-union-
authorized (wildcat) strikes, even if the result would leave the employer
without means to recoup his losses from the wildcat strikes.
44 The Court's
finding completes a 180-degree turn in the last seventy years from holding
employees solely liable for damages for their collective bargaining activi-
ties4 5 to finding union employees immune to damage suits for their partici-
pation either in, or out, of union strike activities.
III. COMPLETE AUTO TRANSIT. INC. V. REiS
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis ,46 the Supreme Court was confronted
with whether to exercise its judicial inventiveness to fashion a federal com-
mon law of labor as prescribed by Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mdis, 47 or
to narrowly construe perceived congressional intent. With this admonition
in mind, the Court acknowledged the Lincoln Mills prescription, but noted
that Lincoln Mills did not call for judicial second-guessing of legislative com-
mands; rather, "in fashioning federal law under § 301(a) substantial defer-
ence should be paid to revealed congressional intention.
'48 The Court
deferred, in its affirmance of the Sixth Circuit, both to perceived congres-
sional intent and to the Atkinson and Sinclair Oil decisions.
49
A. The Employers' Position
The employers mounted a three-pronged attack on the Sixth Circuit's
dismissal of their damage claims against the individual wildcatters.
50
Branding the Sixth Circuit's analysis "at best superficial,'
'
15 the employers
argued primarily that the court failed to distinguish the factual differences
42. See H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
43. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 509 (1962).
44. 101 S. Ct. at 1840.
45. See note I supra.
46. 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981).
47. 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957). In Lincoln Mills, a dispute over whether federal district
courts had jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration provision in a collective-bargaining agreement,
the Court held that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 confers both proce-
dural and subject matter jurisdiction on federal district courts regarding labor management
controversies. The Court held that "in the penumbra of express statutory mandates," the lower
courts should exercise their "judicial inventiveness" in fashioning federal labor common law.
Id. at 457.
48. 101 S. Ct. at 1840. The opinion first discussed procedural requirements for obtaining a
Boys Markets injunction. See note 34 supra. Issuance of the injunction and analysis behind its
issuance are not pertinent to case analysis of the applicability of a damage remedy against
wildcat strikers individually. This, however, does not suggest that Boys Markets injunctions may
not issue individually against the wildcatters; the Court specifically reserved opinion on that
particular issue. See note 83 infa. Some state courts, however, have issued injunctions against
wildcatters individually. See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. Perkins, 411 S.W.2d 935 (Ky. App.
1967).
49. 101 S. Ct. at 1840.
50. Petitioner's Brief at 9.
51. Id. Petitioners insisted the Sixth Circuit did not address the fact that the strikers' ac-
tions were neither ratified nor authorized by the unions; the employees only were sued, individ-
ually, for individual breaches of the labor contract. Id. at 14.
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between the Danbug Hatters cases and those of the instant case. For example,
in Danbuy Hatters, the employees acted pursuant to their union's directive,
while in this case, they did not. The employers also argued, alternatively,
that a failure to allow a damage claim would leave them without a remedy
and with no means to enforce the "integrity" of the labor contract. 52 A
damage remedy, they urged, would insure that employees would recognize
their contractual responsibilities, would deter future wildcat strikes, and
would promote industrial peace.53 To allow employees to disregard the no-
strike obligation in the agreement without penalty would render the obliga-
tion meaningless, and reduce it to a "hollow promise."
'54
B. The Wildcatlers' Position
Predictably, the employees countered that the Sixth Circuit correctly
interpreted the legislative history of section 301, and specifically argued that
employers do not suffer a lesser degree of protection than that afforded em-
ployees under section 301.55 Moreover, they argued, the Sixth Circuit deci-
sion leaves no gap in section 301 remedies because employers still can
discharge or discipline the wildcatting strikers for breaches of the labor con-
tract.56 They added that no such option exists for employees for an em-
ployer's breach.
57
Attacking the third prong of the employers' onslaught, the employees
asserted that industrial peace would not be enhanced "one iota" by ex-
tending a damage remedy, but instead would be aggravated because collect-
ing such a judgment could result in the same garnishment and attachment
actions workers suffered in the Danbur Hatters debacle. 58 The employees ad-
ded that congressional silence after the Sinclair Oil decision should be consid-
ered tacit approval of the practice of immunizing individuals from damage
liability for breach of a labor contract; 59 any gaps in section 301 should be
filled by Congress, not by the courts.60
C. The Court's Holding
Relying primarily on the legislative history of both section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act and its predecessor, section 10 of the Case Bill, 6 1 the
52. Id. at 23.
The companies are left in a position where they were victimized by a dispute over
which they had no control; were unable to engage in normal operations; were coerced,
albeit unsuccessfully, by the employees to give up additional rights under the agree-
ment; and were left by the courts without any monetary remedy. This result is hardly
what Congress had anticipated when it enacted § 301.
Ad. at 24.
53. Id. at 25-26.
54. Id. at 25.
55. Respondent's Brief at 7.
56. Id. at 8. See also NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953); NLRB v.
Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
57. Respondent's Brief at 7.
58. See note I supra.
59. Respondent's Brief at 32.
60. Id. at 33.
61. H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
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Supreme Court concluded that Congress intended to shield individual
unionists from damage liability for breach of a no-strike clause in a labor
contract. This immunization was intended, according to Justice Brennan's
majority opinion, "even though it might leave the employer unable to re-
cover for his losses." 62 Dismissing employer contentions that a damage rem-
edy is indispensable to preserve the integrity of the labor contract and to
advance the national labor policy of promoting industrial peace, the Court
concluded that employers command "an array of potential remedies . . .
apart from a damage remedy against individuals. ' 63 The remedies cited in-
clude discipline and discharge of wildcat strikers, damages against the union
where the union is responsible for the contract breach, or an injunction
against a union for breach of a no-strike clause where the underlying dispute
is subject to binding arbitration. 64 Of the remedies cited, only two, disci-
pline and discharge, refer to actions that may be taken against union mem-
bers as individuals, not as members of the union as an entity.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE HOLDING
Despite its conclusory language that legislative history reveals a congres-
sional intent to shield individual employees from damage liability for breach
of no-strike clauses, 65 the Court could have decided the issue against the
wildcatters and still have been consistent with both congressional intent and
previous case law, a position advanced by Chief Justice Burger's dissent.
While nothing in section 301 expressly permits damage suits against individ-
uals, nothing expressly prohibits such actions.66 The Atkinson Court noted
that no-strike clauses are binding on indi'idual bargaining unit members, but
held that Congress intended to insulate such individuals from fiscal responsi-
bility for unon liability for breach of a no-strike clause.6 7 Later case law
suggests the Court was leaning toward authorizing actions, including dam-
age suits, against individuals under section 301. 68 The only easily discerni-
ble congressional intent was to prevent a recurrence of the Danbuq Hatters
incident. Imposing liability in that instance would be as unfair as imposing
liability upon a stockholder for debts of the corporation. 69 No such unfair-
ness issue appeared in Complete Auto Transit. Thus, sufficient factual differ-
ences existed for the Court to have imposed fiscal responsibility on the
wildcatters while remaining consistent with congressional intent and previ-
ous decisions7 ° interpreting section 301.
62. 101 S. Ct. at 1840.
63. Id. at 1845 n.18.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1840.
66. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 452 F.2d 49, 52
(7th Cir. 1971).
67. 370 U.S. 238, 246 (1962).
68. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Smith v. Evening
News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448 (1957).
69. See Cox, supra note 4.
70. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
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The better-reasoned analysis emanated from Justice Powell's concur-
ring opinion,7 1 which questioned whether management does indeed enjoy
the plethora of remedies against wildcatters, as suggested by the majority,
72
and charged that the Court was being "unrealistic" when it suggested em-
ployers "have at their disposal a battery of alternate remedies for illegal
strikes." 73 Justice Powell noted first that unions agree to such no-strike pro-
visions in exchange for the employer's promise to arbitrate labor contract
disputes that arise during the life of the contract, each promise being the
consideration for the other, "because the employer yields traditional mana-
gerial autonomy in exchange for industrial peace."'74 Despite these mutual
assurances, he noted, wildcat strikes still occur "with disturbing fre-
quency." 75 Yet, he observed, the cited remedies do not solve the problem of
deterring strikes that "squander human work capacity, the full use of which
is essential to the enjoyment of the Nation's productive potential. ' 76 In ar-
guing that each of the cited remedies, injunction, discharge, internal union
discipline, or a damage suit against the union entity, 77 is illusory, Justice
Powell dissected each remedy and concluded that "[t]he result of the absence
of remedies is a lawless vacuum." 78 Injunctions, while generally prohibited
in labor disputes by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 79 are permitted by Boys Mar-
ket pending arbitration if the grievance underlying the strike is arbitrable.
80
Justice Powell noted that some work stoppages cannot be enjoined, such as
sympathy strikes, 8 1 and that strikers often disobey injunctions. 82 Justice
Powell ignored the fact that such injunctions would be sought against the
strikers individually, not as members of the union. The Court specifically
dodged that particular issue.83 Such an injunction would assume the union
as an entity could be enjoined. But based on the Carbon Fuel holding that a
parent union will be liable in damages for a local affiliate's wildcat strike
only if the parent union authorized or participated in the strike,8 4 no injunc-
71. 101 S. Ct. at 1845 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
72. Id. at 1845. Justice Powell suggests that the remedies available "are largely chimeri-
cal." Id.
73. Id. at 1848.
74. Id. at 1845-46.
75. Id. at 1846. In 1979, 1.5 million workers were idled by strikes. No figures were avail-
able to determine how many of those workers were wildcat strikers. See News and Background
Information, 103 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 99 (1980).
76. 101 S. Ct. at 1846 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
77. Id. at 1847.
78. Id. at 1848.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
80. 101 S. Ct. at 1847 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
81. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
82. 101 S. Ct. at 1847 (Powell, J., concurring in part). Justice Powell mused that "courts
may be reluctant to impose contempt penalties on individual workers; if ordered, such penalties
are difficult to enforce." Id.
83. Id. at 1845 n. 18: "Whether a Boys Market-Buffalo Forge injunction could have been is-
sued against individual union members engaged in the wildcat strike at issue is not before us."
Such a remedy was urged by one commentator. See Note, Labor Lau--Sction 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act-Individual Liabilty of Employees for an Unauthorized Work Stoppage In
Breath of the No-Stinke Clause of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1657, 1671
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Labor Law].
84. 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
1982]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
tion could issue against a union disavowing the wildcat strike.85
Justice Powell argued that discharge, although feasible and lawful,
86
proves unrealistic for three reasons. First, the employer cannot fire all wild-
catters in a large wildcat strike or he will cripple production. Second, selec-
tive discharge may be illegal where exercised discriminately and such
discharges may exacerbate, not alleviate, worker unrest. Third, discharges
sometimes are denied by arbitrators.8 7 Justice Powell then observed that
internal union discipline has been proven ineffective because wildcat strikes
often are "directed at the incumbent union leadership as much as at com-
pany management. ' 88 He concluded by suggesting Congress supply the nec-
essary remedial legislation to combat wildcat strikes that are "at war" with
labor rights and orderly labor relations.8 9
Justice Burger's dissent, joined by Justice Rehnquist, 90 confused labor
contracts with individual commercial contracts. Nearly forty years ago, Jus-
tice Jackson eloquently distinguished the two types of agreements inj.I Case
Co. o. NLRB, 91 where the Court held that union-negotiated collective bar-
gaining agreements supersede any private employment contracts arranged
by the employer and any employees within the bargaining unit. The!.
Case Court equated collective bargaining agreements with tariffs:
[Tariffs] do not of themselves establish any relationships, but .. .
do govern the terms of the shipper or insurer or customer relations
whenever and with whomever it may be established . . . . The
employer .. .is free to select those he will employ or discharge.
But the terms of the employment already have been traded out.
There is little left to individual agreement except the act of
hiring.
92
TheJ Case Court said further that:
[an] individual hiring contract is subsidiary to the terms of the
trade agreement and may not waive any of its benefits ....
Wherever private contracts conflict with [the trade agreement],
they obviously must yield. . . . The very purpose of providing by
statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of sep-
arate agreements of employees with terms which reflect the
85. One commentator argues for such injunctive relief against individual wildcatters.
"Unless there is a remedy against individual violators of a labor contract (and preferably imme-
diate injunctive relief), as a practical matter, the employer has no remedy at all in most cases."
See Spelfogel, Wildcat Strikes and Minory Concerted Activit--Discptline, Damage Suits and Injunctions,
SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION: LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1973, 157, 195 (1973).
86. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
87. 101 S. Ct. at 1847, 1848 (Powell, J., concurring in part). See Spelfogel, supra note 85, at
184; Note, Reaction to the Wildcat Strike-The Employer's Dilemma, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 423,
429-436 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Employer's Dilemma]; Note, Employer Remedies for Breach of No-
Strike Clauses, 39 IND. L.J. 387, 403 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Employer Remedtis].
88. 101 S. Ct. at 1848 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
89. Id. at 1849.
90. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
91. 321 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1944).
92. Id. at 336-39. Compare this with Cox's observation that a "collective agreement is
most workable when it is treated as a constitutional instrument or basic statute charging an




strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group
. . . . The practice and philosophy of collective bargaining looks
with suspicion on such individual advantages.
93
Despite the faulty equation of labor contracts with ordinary commercial
contracts, the Complete Auto Transit dissent correctly distinguished the factual
situation of the Danbug Hatters cases from that of the instant case and con-
cluded that congressional intent would have been served by imposing indi-
vidual liability and accountability through a damage remedy.94 The
dissent, framing the issue as imposing individual liability for individual con-
duct taken without union investment, sharply chastised the majority for pe-
nalizing the employer and rewarding the wildcatters:
It seems to me that, by now, the American labor movement has
matured sufficiently so that neither unions nor their members need
this kind of artificial, excessively paternalistic protection for admit-
tedly illegal acts-a protection contrary to fundamental, centuries-
old concepts of individual accountability. The stability of unions
and the harmony of industrial relations will be enhanced, not im-
paired, by applying to union members the same standards of ac-
countability that govern all other individuals in society.
95
The Chief Justice concluded that a damage remedy would deter future wild-
cat strikes and thereby promote industrial peace. But Chief Justice Burger,
along with the majority, failed to address the adequacy of the damage rem-
edy itself as either a deterrent to, or as adequate compensation for, losses
from wildcat strikes. The wisdom of extracting damages from individuals
has been questioned 96 on the ground that such a judgment would barely
compensate an employer for strike-related losses, and would simply serve as a
device for an employer to punish strikers. 9 7 To collect such a judgment
would also hark back to Danbury Hatters, the very spectre Congress wanted to
avoid.
The deterrent effect of damages has been conceded. Damages arguably
would antagonize the workers no more than would summary discharge;98
thus, a damage remedy alone would not inevitably aggravate already
strained industrial relations. 99 The problem not pointed out, however, is
reconciling the nature of the damage remedy itself, which is punitive, with
the nature of the Taft-Hartley Act, which is remedial in nature and pur-
pose.' ° Because few individual workers would be financially able to pro-
93. 321 U.S. at 336-38.
94. 101 S. Ct. at 1850-51 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 1851.
96. See Employer's Dilemma, supra note 87, at 436-37. See also Gould, The Status of Unauthor-
ized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the National Labor Relations Act, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 672 (1967);
Recent Decisions, 6 GA. L. REV. 797, 801 (1972).
97. See, e.g., Givens, Responsibthity of Indizidual Employees for Breaches of No-Strike Clauses, 14
INDUS. LAB. REL. REV. 595, 596 (1961). Givens charged that a damages remedy against wild-
catters would be "cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 600.
98. See Labor Law, supra note 83, at 1669-70.
99. See Employer Remedies, supra note 87, at 402.
100. Brown, Exploring the World of Remedies, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION: LABOR
LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1968, 69, 83 (1968). Brown at that time was a member of the National
Labor Relations Board. See also the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976), which gives
the National Relations Board its remedial powers.
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vide adequate compensation to the employer for wildcat strike-caused losses,
the damage remedy would serve more to punish the wildcatter than it would
to compensate the aggrieved employer. Moreover, a damage remedy, even if
collectable, would be a "hollow reward" to the business ruined because of
lost customers resulting from the wildcat strike.10 ' A punitive damage rem-
edy, notwithstanding its conceded deterrent effect, would be inconsistent
with the remedial nature of national labor policy as currently enacted.
Solutions to this inequitable situation range from imposing strict liabil-
ity on the parent union for actions of its local affiliates who breach no-strike
clauses 10 2 to subcontracting the strikers' jobs. 10 3 Other remedies could in-
clude requiring the union to post a bond or procure insurance policies to
cover possible wildcat strike losses, or possibly inserting provisions in the la-
bor contract requiring the union either to replace the strikers immediately so
production can resume or pay all resulting damages.' 0 4 When a certain
number or percentage of the union work force engages in an unauthorized
work stoppage, the courts could presume the strike to have been union-au-
thorized, with the union then liable under Carbon Fuel. Management could
insist either that it be allowed to impose disciplinary penalties on wildcatters
without going through the grievance procedure, or that the union be re-
quired to discipline the wildcatters with set fines, loss of seniority rights or
loss of vacation leave. When compounded with existing employer remedies
of discharge and discipline, these suggested remedies could serve to deter
wildcat strikes or in the alternative provide the employer with some avenue
of relief. At present, no such avenue exists.
None of these suggested measures, however, would command the force
of law required to effectively deter wildcat strikes. Regardless of whether
"Congress meant to exclude individual strikers from damages liability,"'
0 5
Congress now sits in the catbird seat in determining whether union employ-
ees will continue to exploit their immunity for unauthorized work stoppages
as leverage to extract benefits beyond their labor contracts at the expense of
employers, or whether employers will continue to be punished financially by
wildcat strikes.
101. See Employer's Dilemma, supra note 87, at 437.
102. Allison, Wildcat Strikes-The Need for an Enforceable Damages Remedy, 3 UTAH L. REV.
493, 501 (1980).
103. See Employer Remedes, supra note 87, at 405. However, the author admits that this form
of self-help may be "more illusory than real." Id. at 409.
104. See, e.g., Motor Haulage Co., 6 LAB. ARB. 720, 726 (1946) (Sheridan, Arb.), wherein the
union was found liable for damages caused by a wildcat strike by some of its members, partly
because the union made no attempt to reprimand the strikers or resupply the employer with
other union workers. The case was not decided under an agency theory, but simply on the
equitable ground that the employer would suffer unfairly because of the unauthorized work
stoppage. The arbitrator said he wanted to avoid giving credence to the then-popular refrain
that one who deals with a union does so at his own peril. See also Great Scott! Super Markets,
Inc. v. Goodman, 50 Mich. App. 635, 213 N.W.2d 762 (1974), in which the court held that the
employer bargained away his opportunity and contract right to recover damages against the
union for wildcat strike damages. By extension, the court thus suggested that had the employer
so bargained, he could have recovered for such strike-related damages. Such terms, however,
must be bargained for, and will be subject to "the political realities of the shop." See also Em-
ployer's Dilemma, supra note 87, at 437.




By holding that individual union members are insulated from damages
arising from their breach of their labor contract's no-strike clause, the Court
has swung full circle from Danbury Hatters. That individual unionists acted
outside union directives in Complete Auto Transit, but acted pursuant to union
orders in Danbury Hatters, proved inconsequential to the Court's rationale.
The significance of Complete Auto Transit becomes apparent when analyzed
with the Carbon Fuel finding of union liability for actions of their local affili-
ates only under traditional agency principles. 10 6 The two cases combine to
eliminate any damage compensation to employers from either unions or
their individual members for wildcat strike-caused losses. The net effect of
these two cases, when combined with section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, is to judicially and congressionally create a union veil to
shield both individual unionists and union officials from damage liability for
wildcat strikes. Thus, unions, as unincorporated associations, and their
members now share the same limited liability as corporate officers and direc-
tors.' 0 7 Just as corporations are considered entities distinct from their share-
holders,10 8 unions similarly are held to be distinct from their members or
local affiliates. 109
This fiction of corporate limited liability, however, "may be and should
be disregarded in the interests of and to promote justice in such cases as
fraud, violations of law or contract, public wrong or to work out the equities
among members of the corporation internally .. ."110 This disregard of
the corporate entity, or a piercing of the corporate veil, is generally em-
ployed in fastening liability upon individual corporate officials when: 1) the
unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and individual
merge, so no distinction between them exists; and 2) an inequitable result
will follow by treating the corporation's acts as solely those of the corporate
entity."' The basic rule holds that a corporation will be considered a
fictional legal entity with limited liability until it is "used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime ... ,12
The same analysis could be applied to justify a judicial piercing of the
union veil, should the underlying nature of federal labor policy evolve from
being remedial to being punitive. Given the current remedial purpose of
federal labor policy, piercing the union veil to assess individual damage lia-
106. 444 U.S. at 216.
107. See also 92 CONG. REC. 5705 (1946) (remarks of Sen. Taft equating suability and liabil-
ity of unions with that of corporations.)
108. Se I W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, § 25 (rev.
perm. ed. 1974).
109. See Dean v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 17 F. Supp. 748, 750 (W.D. La. 1936)
(citing UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 345 (1922)).
110. W. FLETCHER, supra note 108, at § 25 (emphasis added). See generaly Krendl &
Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil" Focusing the Inqui7y, 55 DEN. L.J. 1 (1978).
111. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. L. Bloom Sons, 206 Cal. App. 2d 848, 24 Cal. Rptr. 311, 313
(1962).
112. See W. FLETCHER, supra note 108, at § 41. See, e.g., Industrial Comm'n v. Lavach, 165
Colo. 433, 439 P.2d 359, 361 (1968); Contractors Heating & Supp. Co. v. Scherb, 163 Colo. 584,




bility would be an inconsistent punitive result. For now, the focus shifts to
Congress to consider whether to remedy, or to perpetuate, an apparent ineq-
uitable dilemma.' 13
Richard Michael Kaud
113. Cf. Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1982) where the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the National Labor Relations Board and held
that an employer lawfully could punish a union official who participated in a wildcat strike
more severely than rank-and-file wildcatters. The court reasoned that such selective discipline is
permitted if the collective bargaining process has imposed higher duties on union officials than
on rank-and-file employees.
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